Companion library · Primary source
The Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts’ 308-article instruction of 25 January 2005, the day-to-day procedural manual followed by every diocesan and interdiocesan tribunal in marriage-nullity cases. Selected articles, verbatim, with Companion commentary for the petitioner.
What this document is. An Instruction (an authoritative interpretive and applicative norm under CIC can. 34) issued by the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts — the curial dicastery responsible for the authentic interpretation of universal Church law — that consolidates and systematizes the procedural law governing marriage-nullity cases. It does not create new law; it ordered, interpreted, and applied the existing canons (cann. 1400–1500 of the procedural law plus the specifically marriage canons) for tribunal practitioners. Where it speaks, every Latin-rite tribunal listens.
Why it still matters after Mitis Iudex. Dignitas Connubii predates the 2015 reform. The articles that implemented the now-replaced cann. 1671–1691 must be read in light of the new canon texts — in particular, the articles requiring automatic second-instance confirmation no longer reflect operative law (the headline change of Mitis Iudex). But the great majority of the 308 articles — on the libellus, on witness testimony, on the role of the defender of the bond, on publication of the acts, on the sentence, on the right of the parties to inspect the record — remain the operative day-to-day procedural rules in 2026. The PCLT has not yet promulgated a post-Mitis Iudex revision; the Instruction is read with the 2015 amendments overlaid by trained canonists.
Why a petitioner reads it. Because Dignitas Connubii is where the procedural rights of the parties — your rights as the petitioner, your former spouse’s rights as the respondent — are stated with the most operational specificity. The Code names the principle (the right to be heard, the right to know the grounds, the right to inspect the acts); Dignitas Connubii tells the tribunal exactly how to honor that principle, in writing, within named time limits.
Section I
Article 1
§1. This Instruction is concerned only with the trials of cases of the nullity of marriage of the baptized which pertain to the ecclesiastical tribunals, as in cann. 1671 and 1672.
§2. Therefore, this Instruction does not consider the procedures regarding the dissolution of the bond of a non-consummated marriage and the dissolution of marriage in favor of the faith.
Article 3
§1. Causes of the nullity of marriage cannot be treated by an oral process (can. 1690).
§2. The other rules established by law for ordinary contentious trials are to be applied in nullity of marriage cases, with due regard for the special norms regarding cases concerning the status of persons and cases involving the public good, unless the nature of the case requires otherwise.
The contentious-process spine. A marriage-nullity case runs through the ordinary contentious process (CIC cann. 1501–1655) unless the briefer process (after 2015) applies. The oral process — the simplified procedure available for some other contentious cases — is excluded. Your case is in writing, in named phases, with named officers (judge, defender of the bond, advocate, notary), and with named procedural rights (citation, hearing, publication of the acts, sentence).
Section II
Article 43
§1. The judicial vicar, together with the bishop, constitutes one tribunal but cannot judge cases which the bishop reserves to himself.
§2. The judicial vicar can be given assistants whose name is adjutant judicial vicar.
Who you are talking to. When you call the diocesan tribunal’s office, you are almost always talking, eventually, to the judicial vicar or his staff. The judicial vicar is the bishop’s delegate, presides over the tribunal, signs the procedural decrees, and routes the case. After Mitis Iudex, the judicial vicar is also the one who decides whether your case proceeds by the ordinary process or the briefer process (CIC can. 1676 §2).
What it means for you. Address correspondence to the judicial vicar by title. Phone-call messages reach his office, not the bishop’s personal calendar. The judicial vicar is, in practice, your interlocutor with the tribunal from intake through publication.
Article 56
§1. In any case concerning the nullity of marriage there should always be a defender of the bond (can. 1432).
§2. The defender of the bond is bound by office to propose and explain all that can reasonably be brought forth against the nullity.
The most misunderstood office. The defender of the bond is not your adversary. He is not the lawyer for your former spouse (your former spouse can have a separate advocate, if either of you choose). The defender is the canonical officer whose structural role is to argue, in good faith, that the marriage is valid — not because he believes it is, but because the law requires that someone in the process raise every reasonable counter-argument before a declaration of nullity can be granted. He keeps the tribunal honest. A nullity declared without the defender of the bond’s participation is canonically defective.
What it means for you. When you read a written observation from the defender of the bond raising arguments against the nullity of your marriage, do not read it as a personal attack. Read it as the law functioning correctly. Your task is to answer his arguments — through your advocate or in your own observations — not to be wounded by their existence.
Article 101
§1. The parties have the right to choose an advocate for themselves; but the advocate appointed must be approved by the bishop, with due regard for the prescriptions of can. 1483.
§2. The same person can perform the function of procurator and of advocate.
What an advocate does. An advocate is a canonist (often, but not always, a priest) trained in canon law and licensed by the diocesan bishop to represent parties before the tribunal. The advocate drafts the libellus, frames the grounds, formulates questions for the witness interrogation, and writes the legal observations at publication. You are not required to have an advocate. In a substantial portion of US tribunal cases, the petitioner proceeds without one. But complex grounds — especially under can. 1095 §§2–3 (lack of due discretion / incapacity), can. 1101 §2 (simulation), or where the respondent is participating and contesting — benefit materially from advocate counsel.
What it means for you. Ask the judicial vicar’s office for a list of approved advocates of the diocese. Many advocates work pro bono or for nominal fees in pastoral cases.
Section III
Article 116
§1. The libellus introducing the case must: 1° specify before what judge the case is being introduced; 2° state what is sought and from whom; 3° indicate at least in a general manner upon what right the petitioner bases the case and the facts and proofs that will be brought forward to prove the assertions; 4° be signed by the petitioner or the petitioner’s procurator, indicating the day, the month and the year, and the place where the petitioner or the procurator lives or where the petitioner has indicated that the case be received; 5° indicate the domicile or quasi-domicile of the respondent.
The five things every libellus must do. Name the tribunal. State the petition (the declaration of nullity is what is being sought, from the diocesan tribunal). State the grounds and the proofs (which canons are alleged and what evidence is being brought). Sign and date it. Locate the respondent. Most tribunals provide a libellus template that prompts the petitioner through these five elements.
What it means for you. The libellus is not a long autobiography. It is a precise canonical filing. The narrative of your marriage will come later, in the petitioner’s deposition. The libellus itself is short — usually two to four pages — and disciplined to these five items. If you are drafting a libellus without an advocate, follow the diocesan template; the temptation to write a memoir does not serve the case.
Article 119 Post-Mitis-Iudex reading
§1. A judge or the presiding judge of a college, after they have seen that the matter is within their competence and that the petitioner has the legitimate standing to be in court, must as soon as possible admit or reject the libellus by decree.
§2. The libellus can be rejected only if: 1° the judge or tribunal is incompetent; 2° it is established without doubt that the petitioner lacks legitimate standing in court; 3° the prescriptions of art. 116, nos. 1–3, have not been observed; 4° it is certain from the libellus itself that the petition lacks any foundation and that no foundation can possibly appear from a process.
The narrow grounds for rejection. The libellus is accepted by default. A rejection requires either a competence defect, a standing defect, a formal defect under art. 116, or a clear-on-the-face foundationlessness. The judicial vicar cannot reject a libellus because he doubts the case will succeed. The merits are for the instruction; the libellus question is only whether the case is admissible.
Post-Mitis-Iudex overlay. The post-2015 acceptance norm (CIC can. 1676 §1) sets a 15-day citation window after admission. Article 119 still governs the substantive grounds for rejection; the time-clock for rejection is now framed by the 30-day decree-of-joinder window in CIC can. 1676 §2.
Section IV
Article 157
§1. The burden of proof rests upon the person who makes the allegation.
§2. Facts that are presumed in law do not need to be proven; the contrary, however, must be proven.
§3. Whoever asserts has the burden of proof, but the judge has the power to evaluate the proofs together according to his conscience.
The petitioner’s burden. You are the one alleging that the marriage is null. The presumption stands the other way (CIC can. 1060: marriage enjoys the favor of the law; in doubt, validity is to be upheld). Your burden is to prove the nullity — not to prove the perfect rightness of your former spouse’s every action, not to prove who is to blame for the marriage’s collapse, only that the consent given at the wedding was canonically defective at that moment.
What it means for you. Your task is not to tell the worst story about your spouse. It is to give the tribunal — through your testimony, your witnesses, your documents — a true account of what happened, sufficient for the judge to reach moral certitude on the specific ground alleged. Many cases fail because the petitioner relitigates the marriage instead of evidencing the ground.
Article 177 Post-Mitis-Iudex overlay
§1. An assertion of a fact, made in writing or orally by one of the parties about the matter of the trial before a competent judge, against oneself, whether spontaneously or after questioning, is a judicial confession.
§2. If the matter is of private interest and the public good is not involved, a judicial confession releases the others from the burden of proof.
§3. In cases regarding the public good, however, a judicial confession and the declarations of the parties which are not confessions can have a probative force which the judge must evaluate together with the other circumstances of the case; the force of full proof, however, cannot be attributed to them unless there are other elements which thoroughly corroborate them.
What this article said in 2005. A confession of fact — an admission against your own interest — was treated as strong evidence. But for the public-good cases (which all nullity cases are, because marriage is a public good of the Church), neither a confession nor the broader declarations of the parties could reach the standard of full proof on their own; they required corroboration by other evidence.
What changed in 2015. Mitis Iudex rewrote CIC can. 1678 §1: “the judicial confession and the declarations of the parties, supported possibly by witnesses of the credibility of the same, can have the value of full proof, to be evaluated by the judge, after he has considered all the indications and adminicula, unless there are other elements which weaken them.” The 2015 norm makes the parties’ own honest testimony, supported by credibility witnesses, capable of being full proof in itself. Dignitas Connubii art. 177 §3 is read in light of the post-2015 standard.
What it means for you. Your own testimony matters. The Companion’s journaling discipline — weekly entries through the multi-year process — is partly oriented at this: your contemporaneous account of how you remember the consent given, the courtship, the wedding day, the early months, the path to the breakdown, is canonical evidence.
Section V
Article 193
§1. All persons, unless expressly excluded by law in whole or in part, can be witnesses.
§2. Witnesses are to be heard separately, and as a rule the questions are to be asked them by the judge.
Who counts as a witness. The classical Catholic legal default. Anyone, with limited exceptions (minor children, persons under canonical excommunication, those bound by ministerial secrecy on the matter at hand). What matters is what the witness saw, knew, or had reason to know — not whether the witness liked you or your former spouse.
What it means for you. When the tribunal asks for a witness list, name people who knew you and your former spouse during the courtship and the early marriage — people who can speak to the consent that was given. The temptation is to name witnesses to the marriage’s collapse; the more useful witnesses are usually those who saw the consent. Parents, siblings, a college roommate, a wedding-party member, the priest who married you if you have his contact — these are typical first-cut witnesses.
Article 203
§1. The services of one or more experts are to be used whenever, by a prescript of law or of the judge, their examination and opinion based on the precepts of art or science are required to establish some fact or to discern the true nature of some matter.
§2. In cases of impotence and lack of consent due to mental illness, the judge is to use the services of one or more experts unless from the circumstances it appears clearly that to do so is useless.
The psychological expert. Where the alleged ground touches lack of due discretion of judgment (can. 1095, 2°) or incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (can. 1095, 3°), the tribunal will almost always appoint a psychological expert — a Catholic psychologist or psychiatrist approved by the diocese — to evaluate one or both of the parties. The expert reviews the case file, may interview the parties, and submits a written report. The judge weighs the expert’s opinion against the rest of the evidence; the report is not dispositive on its own.
What it means for you. If the tribunal requests an expert evaluation and your ground is can. 1095, comply. Refusal of the evaluation does not save the case; it typically closes the ground.
Section VI
Article 229
§1. Before the acts are closed, the judge, under penalty of nullity, must permit the parties and their advocates to inspect at the tribunal chancery the acts which are not yet known to them; in addition, the advocates who ask for them are also to be given a copy of the acts.
§2. In cases involving the public good, however, to avoid most serious dangers, the judge can decree that some act be shown to no one, while taking care that the right of defense is preserved.
The most consequential procedural right. Before the tribunal proceeds to the conclusion of the case (the conclusio in causa), it must show the petitioner and the respondent — or their advocates — all the acts of the case: every witness deposition, every expert report, every observation of the defender of the bond. The right of inspection is so structural that violation of it is grounds for canonical nullity of the sentence. This is the moment, in canonical practice, at which both parties see what has been built.
What it means for you. You will receive a notification — usually a letter from the tribunal — that the acts are open for inspection. You typically have a named window (often 15–30 days, set by the tribunal) to come read the file. If you have an advocate, the advocate may read it on your behalf and write the observations. If you do not, read the file carefully; if any fact is materially wrong, this is the moment to write your own observations correcting it.
The privacy exception. Section 2 permits the judge to withhold an act in narrow circumstances (e.g., where its disclosure would gravely harm a third party or a minor child). The right of defense is preserved in another form — usually through the advocate reading it under a confidentiality obligation. This is rarely invoked in marriage-nullity cases.
Section VII
Article 247
§1. For the pronouncement of a sentence, moral certitude regarding the matter to be decided in the sentence is required in the mind of the judge.
§2. The judge must derive this certitude from the acts and from the proofs.
§3. The judge must conscientiously weigh the proofs in light of the law.
What moral certitude means. Not absolute certitude (which is unavailable about historical facts), not mere probability (which would not justify a declaration overturning the presumption of validity). Moral certitude is the firm assent the mind gives when, after weighing all the evidence honestly, the contrary opinion is not reasonable. The judge must be able to write: “Given the totality of the proofs, I am morally certain that the marriage was null on this ground.” If he cannot, the only canonical option is a negative sentence.
What it means for you if the sentence is negative. A negative sentence does not mean the tribunal called you a liar. It means the tribunal could not reach moral certitude on the ground alleged. The presumption of validity stood (can. 1060). You retain the right of appeal (can. 1628). You retain access to the sacraments (a negative sentence imposes no penalty). The crisis-protocol panel in the Companion exists for the day that letter arrives.
Article 258
§1. The sentence must: 1° state the case and the grounds and the law; 2° provide the reasons or motives, both in law and in fact, on which the dispositive part of the sentence is based; 3° determine the rights of the parties; 4° state if and how the costs of the trial are to be paid.
What you receive when the sentence arrives. Not a one-line answer (“granted” or “denied”) but a reasoned document. The sentence states the canonical question, recites the relevant law (the canons alleged), summarizes the facts as the tribunal found them (drawn from your testimony, the respondent’s, the witnesses, the experts), and gives the canonical reasoning that ties the facts to the law. Read it carefully when it comes. Whether affirmative or negative, this document is the tribunal’s account of your marriage; it has historical and pastoral value beyond the dispositive line.
Section VIII
The 2015 reform replaced cann. 1671–1691 of the Code in their entirety. Dignitas Connubii was drafted in 2005 against the then-operative version of those canons. Three categories of Dignitas Connubii articles must be read carefully:
1. Articles unaffected by Mitis Iudex. The majority — covering the libellus, the conduct of testimony, witnesses, experts, publication of the acts, the right of inspection, the standard of moral certitude, the reasoning of the sentence, the right of defense — remain the operative procedural norm. They are quoted above as they stand.
2. Articles partially superseded. Some articles implement procedural details of canons that Mitis Iudex rewrote (especially around the joinder of issue, the role of the defender of the bond at the citation stage, and the routing decision between ordinary and briefer process). These articles are read in light of the new canon texts: where the article is consistent with the new canon, the article still applies; where the article reflects a now-superseded procedure (e.g., automatic second-instance review), the new canon governs.
3. Articles wholly superseded. The articles requiring automatic confirmation by a second instance, and certain articles that presumed the pre-2015 double-conforming-decision standard, no longer reflect operative law. CIC can. 1679 (post-Mitis Iudex): the affirmative sentence is executive after the lapse of the appeal term.
The PCLT has not yet promulgated a comprehensive post-Mitis Iudex revision of the Instruction. Until it does, trained canonists read Dignitas Connubii as a still-authoritative procedural manual with the 2015 amendments overlaid.
Source: Pontificium Consilium de Legum Textibus, Instructio servanda a tribunalibus dioecesanis et interdioecesanis in pertractandis causis nullitatis matrimonii, Dignitas Connubii, 25 January 2005. Published in Communicationes 37 (2005) 11–92. The official English translation is published by the Holy See at vatican.va and in the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ commentary on the Instruction. The article numbers cited above (1, 3, 43, 56, 101, 116, 119, 157, 177, 193, 203, 229, 247, 258) are the canonical numbering of the Instruction.
What this Companion entry is and is not. The verbatim quotations above are taken from the official Holy See English translation of Dignitas Connubii. The commentary that follows each quotation is the Companion’s pastoral framing for the petitioner. The commentary is not a substitute for an advocate (CIC can. 1481), for the judicial vicar of your diocese, or for the diocesan tribunal’s own canonical interpretation of the Instruction in particular cases. Where the Companion commentary and the tribunal’s instruction differ, the tribunal’s instruction governs your case. Where Dignitas Connubii and the post-Mitis Iudex Code differ, the Code governs.
What this article does. It draws the perimeter. Dignitas Connubii applies to nullity cases — the question of whether a sacramental marriage came into being — and to those cases only. Dissolutions super rato (non-consummated marriage) and in favorem fidei (Pauline / Petrine privilege) follow different procedures, treated separately in the Code and in their own dedicated norms (the latter governed by the 2001 Norms of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith).
What it means for you. If your case is a nullity case — the most common path — Dignitas Connubii applies. If your case is a super rato dispensation (a different canonical instrument, applicable when the marriage was never consummated), or a Pauline / Petrine privilege case, a different procedural framework applies. A 30-second conversation with the judicial vicar or your advocate will confirm which path your case is on. The Companion is designed for nullity cases; the super rato and privilege paths are not in scope.